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Abstract
We analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a new dollar is divided among committee
members in each of an inﬁnity of periods. In each period, a committee member is recognized
and oﬀers a proposal for the division of the dollar. The proposal is implemented if it is approved
by a majority. If the proposal is rejected, then last period’s allocation is implemented. We show
existence of equilibrium in Markovian strategies. It is such that irrespective of the initial status
quo, the discount factor, or the probabilities of recognition, the proposer extracts the entire dollar
in all periods but the initial two. We also derive a fully strategic version of McKelvey’s (1976),
(1979) dictatorial agenda setting, so that a player with exclusive access to the formulation of
proposals can extract the entire dollar in all periods except the ﬁrst. The equilibrium collapses
when within period payoﬀs are suﬃciently concave. Winning coalitions may comprise players
with high instead of low recognition probabilities, ceteris paribus.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C73, C78, D72.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory has had a profound impact on our thinking about political interaction due to
the counter-intuitive nature of its conclusions. When it comes to majority rule, prominent in the
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1parade of paradoxical results of this literature are those by Plott (1967), and McKelvey (1976, 1979).
The former convincingly demonstrates that stable policies (that beat every other by majority vote)
in a continuous space of social alternatives are generically non-existent in more than one policy
dimensions. The latter, assuming the non-existence of stable policies, establishes that the entire set
of alternatives are entangled in a majority preference cycle. These results are suggestive but not
conclusive about the stability and/or predictability (or lack thereof) of collective decision making
under majority rule. In particular, neither precludes the existence of non-cooperative equilibrium
a la Nash. Building on that observation and the sequential bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982),
a non-cooperative literature on collective decision making has ﬂourished in the last two decades.1
While this literature ﬁlls one lacuna in the theory of collective choice by providing a palpable
solution concept, it is ill-suited to address the dynamic implications of social preference intransitiv-
ity engendered by individual preference aggregation via majority rule. For that purpose we need to
specify game forms that trace collective choice over time, yet most of the existing literature assumes
that interaction ceases once the committee has reached a decision. The goal of this paper is to
further our understanding of equilibrium dynamics in a committee setting in which policies drawn
from a multidimensional policy space can be revised ad inﬁnitum. Speciﬁcally we study a stochastic
game with an odd number of ﬁve2 or more players who decide on the division of a ﬁxed budget (a
dollar) under majority rule. In each period, one of the committee members is recognized with some
ﬁxed probability and makes a proposal. If the proposal is approved by a majority then the dollar
is divided in that period accordingly. Otherwise, the status quo allocation (which is deﬁned as last
period’s division) is implemented. The above setup constitutes a natural framework for the study
of dynamic political interaction. Independently of variation in the process of agenda formation, all
existing constitutional democracies require that new legislation must be pitted against the status
quo in a ﬁnal vote before its promulgation. Thus, as in the current analysis, the status quo policy
remains in eﬀect and accrues payoﬀs to players, until it is beaten via majority vote by the policy
that replaces it.
A ﬁrst issue we have to confront in this environment is that of existence of equilibrium. We
focus our analysis on simple equilibria such that players’ behavior in each period is only conditioned
on payoﬀ relevant information (Tirole and Maskin (2001)), but our assumptions specify a stochastic
1E.g., Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Merlo and Wilson (1995), Banks and Duggan (2000), (2006), etc.
2The case of three-member committees is special, as we discuss shortly, and is covered under more restrictive
assumptions in Kalandrakis (2004).
2game with continuous action and state spaces, for which such equilibria need not exist.3 We are
able to overcome this diﬃculty and establish and characterize a (reﬁned) Markov Perfect Nash
equilibrium via a combination of direct methods and abstract arguments. The existence proof is
based on two steps. First (Proposition 1), we obtain a closed form solution for equilibirum strategies
in a subset of the state space that is absorbing given these strategies. In the second step (Lemma
1), we apply a ﬁxed point theorem in order to show that, given the above strategies, there exist
extensions of these strategies to the entire state space that move the game (with probability one)
in the absorbing set characterized in the ﬁrst step. In Proposition 2 we show that these extended
strategies constitute an equilibrium.
With existence of equilibrium established, the important questions revolve around the nature
of equilibrium policy dynamics. Intuition oﬀers an abundance of forces to induce policy moderation
in our framework. This follows from reasoning about the incentives of players both in their role
as voters as well as as proposers. By adopting an extreme (but desirable) division in the current
period, players face the risk that future proposers and coalitions will achieve passage of undesirable
divisions because they will legislate with a status quo division that disadvantages many committee
members. Thus, optimal divisions of the dollar should balance a trade-oﬀ between immediate gains
and a potentially averse stream of future decisions. In sharp contrast to the above intuition, the
equilibrium we characterize is such that the proposer extracts the entire dollar in every period
except (possibly) the initial two. This is true for all initial status quo divisions of the dollar
and independent of the discount factor. In eﬀect, despite the fact that players are strategic and
farsighted, the long-run behavior of the system is identical to the one that would prevail in the
same model with myopic behavior (or impatient players).
A similar equilibrium is obtained by Kalandrakis (2004) in the special case of a committee with
three players. Although equilibrium behavior is identical in the long-run (the proposer extracts
the entire dollar in each period), with n = 3 players there exist initial status quo such that, with
positive probability, absorption to the set of long-run equilibrium divisions may not occur for any
ﬁnite period t. This is because there is positive probability that the excluded member from last
period’s winning coalition is recognized, and this player is unable to extract the entire dollar when
the other two players have a positive status quo allocation. As we demonstrate in section 3, when
n ≥ 5 there always exist a bare majority of members with zero status quo allocation for any
3For a detailed discussion of the equilibrium existence problem in these settings, see Duggan and Kalandrakis
(2007).
3proposer recognized in period t = 3. Thus absorption to the long-run equilibrium set of policies
occurs with probability one in period t = 3 in the present study. Besides the substantive diﬀerence
in equilibrium dynamics, this discrepancy implies that the case with n = 3 players cannot be
subsumed in the present study using the same line of proof (or vice versa). Kalandrakis (2004)
obtains an equilibrium using direct methods and exploiting the symmetry of the game stemming
from the assumption that players have equal recognition probabilities. Also, Kalandrakis (2004)
requires linear stage payoﬀs.
In the present study, we consider the case stage payoﬀs exhibit diminishing returns, and relax
the assumption of equal recognition probabilities. The fact that we consider general recognition
probabilities imposes a signiﬁcant additional burden on the analysis, as the extra heterogeneity
across committee members makes it hard to determine analytically the composition of optimal
coalitions for any given proposer and status quo allocation. This is because, in any given period,
possible coalition partners are now characterized by two features: their status quo allocation and
their recognition probability. It is, of course, much easier to sort out the least expensive players for
inclusion in the proposer’s optimal coalition when players diﬀer in one as opposed to two dimen-
sions. Thus, unlike Kalandrakis (2004), our approach does not involve the analytical derivation
of equilibrium proposal strategies but we are able to establish an equilibrium with general prob-
abilities of recognition. An immediate payoﬀ from this generality is that we tackle an important
question that was originally posed by McKelvey in his seminal papers (1976), (1979). In particular,
McKelvey discusses how a dictatorial agenda setter (a person that formulates the proposal with
probability one in each period) can eventually pass her ideal point via an appropriate sequence of
binary votes between the status quo and a new alternative. McKelvey’s construction is a direct
consequence of his intransitivity result but relies on the unrealistic assumption (as McKelvey ex-
plicitly points out) that players vote on each pair of alternatives myopically, without anticipating
the eventual perils from their immediate gratiﬁcation. Can McKelvey’s dictatorial agenda setting
result be obtained when voters are farsighted? Our analysis gives a conclusive answer for the case
the space of agreements is the division of a dollar (Proposition 3). If a committee member is rec-
ognized with probability one in every period, she can extract the entire dollar in all but the very
ﬁrst period, for all initial status quo and every discount factor.
In addition, we show that the characterized equilibrium collapses when utility from the share
of the dollar displays signiﬁcant diminishing returns, for ﬁxed committee size, or – for ﬁxed level
4of diminishing returns – if the legislature is small (Proposition 5). Thus, concavity seems to play a
diﬀerent role in this model compared to the models where the legislature adjourns once a decision
is reached, since in such settings risk aversion allows the proposer to extract more of the surplus
(Harrington (1990)). Finally, also contrary to the comparative statics in the Baron and Ferejohn
model established by Eraslan (2002), we ﬁnd that players that have high probability of becoming
the proposer are less expensive coalition partners, ceteris paribus (Proposition 4). In particular,
we show that there exist equilibria such that for certain status quo players with higher recognition
probabilities (but equal status quo allocation) are included in the winning coalition with higher
probability.
Before we move to the detailed presentation and analysis of the model, we further discuss
related contributions. Closely related to the present model is that analyzed by Epple and Riordan
(1987). They study subgame perfect equilibria of a divide-the-dollar game in which three players
alternate making proposals and establish that at least two radically diﬀerent sequences of divisions
of the dollar can be supported in equilibrium. This result can be interpreted as a justiﬁcation
for the focus on Markovian equilibria, as it suggests that a folk-theorem may obtain for these
games. The ﬁrst study of Markov Perfect equilibria with the game form we consider in the present
study is by Baron (1996), who analyzes the case of a one-dimensional policy space and shows that
policies converge to the median in the long run. Baron and Herron (2003) numerically analyze
a ﬁnitely repeated version of the same game with two policy dimensions and three legislators.
They ﬁnd that equilibrium decisions tend to be more centrally located with a higher discount
factor and a longer time horizon. Thus, both Baron (1996) and Baron and Herron (2003) obtain
qualitatively diﬀerent long-run equilibrium outcomes compared to the present analysis, suggesting
that the discrepancy may originate from the diﬀerent policy spaces. While the above studies are
concerned with applications in special policy spaces, Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007) study a general
model with only smoothness conditions imposed on players’ preferences and minimal restrictions
on the policy space. Among other results, they establish existence and continuity properties of
pure strategy Markovian equilibria, show that all such equilibria are essentially pure, and obtain
suﬃcient conditions for the policy process to have a unique invariant distribution. Despite their
generality, these results do not apply in the model considered in this study, because Duggan and
Kalandrakis assume stochastic shocks on preferences and the status quo which are not captured in
the present model.
5Related to the setup of Baron (1996), Kalandrakis (2004), and the present study is the model
with a one-dimensional state space of Cho (2005a) who studies a multi-party parliamentary democ-
racy with both bargaining and elections. Cho (2005b) and Fong (2005) both study two-dimensional
models with transferable utility but diﬀerent bargaining protocols from those considered presently,
the former focusing on cabinet dissolution and the vote of conﬁdence institution. Transferable
utility is also assumed by Gomez and Jehiel (2005) who study eﬃciency properties of equilibrium
in a dynamic coalitional game with a ﬁnite state space. Battaglini and Coate (2007) characterize
stationary equilibria in a model of public good provision, particularistic spending, and taxation
when interaction within periods takes the form of a ﬁnite Baron and Ferejohn (1989) protocol, and
the dynamic link across periods is determined by the stock of the public good. Bernheim, Rangel,
and Rayo (2006) analyze interaction for the determination of a policy in a single legislative period
assuming a sequence of votes on proposals such that each victorious proposal moves to the next
voting round (without being implemented), with the winning proposal in the last voting round
being the implemented policy, and derive conditions so that this implemented policy coincides with
the ideal policy of the last proposer. In section 6 of their study they discuss an extension to a
dynamic model such that implemented agreements can be revised a ﬁnite number of periods. Due
to the special institution assumed by the authors for legislative interaction within periods this mul-
tiperiod model does not generate strategic links between implemented agreements across periods
(as a consequence of their Corollary 1, page 1167). In a general setting applying social choice the-
oretic equilibrium notions, Roger Lagunoﬀ (2005a), (2005b) studies the dynamics of institutional
stability and reform. Penn (2005) analyzes a dynamic model in which proposals arise exogenously
and voting by the committee on these proposals is probabilistic. Random proposals and myopic
voting are analyzed by Ferejohn, McKelvey, and Packel (1984).
In what follows we present the model in detail and deﬁne the equilibrium solution concept.
We establish existence of equilibrium in sections 3 and 4. In section 5 we discuss properties of
equilibrium and extensions. We conclude in section 6.
2 Model & Preliminaries
Consider a set N = {1,...,n} of n = 2κ + 1 committee members, κ ≥ 2. They convene in each
period t = 1,2,... to reach an agreement xt drawn from a set X. Our ultimate goal is to analyze the
6case when X represents all possible divisions of a ﬁxed budget (a dollar) among the n players. In
this case we set X = ∆, where ∆ = {x ∈ Rn
+ :
Pn
i=1 xi = 1}. In section 3, it will prove convenient
to solve an auxiliary game in which the space of possible agreements, X, is restricted to a proper
subset of ∆. The game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each period t = 1,2,... player
i ∈ N is recognized with probability pi ≥ 0,
Pn
i=1 pi = 1, to make a proposal z ∈ X. Having
observed the proposal players vote yes or no. If a majority of κ + 1 or more players vote yes then
the proposed agreement is implemented, i.e., xt = z. Otherwise, if z does not receive the approval
of a majority, then period t’s status quo policy st ∈ X is implemented (i.e., xt = st). The game
then moves to the next period t + 1, with a status quo now being period t’s agreement, st+1 = xt,
and a new round of proposal making and voting.
Players derive stage utility ui : X → R, i ∈ N, from the implemented agreement, xt. We
assume players’ utility depends only on their share of the dollar, so that ui(x) = u(xi) for all
i ∈ N, for a utility function u : [0,1] → R with u0 > 0. We normalize payoﬀs so that u(0) = 0
and u(1) = 1. For analytical tractability, we state some of the more general results under the
restriction that u00 = 0 and payoﬀs are linear with u(xi) = xi. As we explicitly discuss in section
5, our conclusions are qualiﬁed in some important respects in the presence of diminishing returns,
so we admit u00 ≤ 0 unless otherwise stated. Players discount the future with a common factor
δ ∈ (0,1), and their payoﬀ in the game is given by the discounted sum of stage payoﬀs.
We focus the analysis on Markov Perfect equilibria.4 Existence of such equilibria requires
mixing at the proposal stage of the game, so we represent a (mixed) Markov proposal strategy for
player i as a function πi : X → P [X], where P [X] is the space of Borel probability measures over
X.5 We use the somewhat abusive notation πi[· | s] ∈ P [X] to denote player i’s randomization
over proposals when recognized with status quo s. A Markov voting strategy is a function αi :
X × X → {yes,no}, so that αi(s,z) = yes indicates player i votes yes on proposal z when
the status quo is s. In the sequel, we opt to work with the equivalent representation of voting
4There are well developed arguments in the literature (e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 2001, and the references therein)
that justify this focus on Markov strategies.
5In general, additional measurability conditions on proposal strategies are necessary in order for players’ expected
payoﬀs to be well deﬁned. For the sake of simplicity, we omit such explicit restrictions and secure measurability of
continuation payoﬀs in the relevant subset of the state space by solving analytically for continuation value functions vi
(as in (5)) in an absorbing subset of the policy space X. Alternatively, we could start with the restriction that proposal
strategies πi are Markov transitions (Aliprantis and Border (1999), deﬁnition 18.8, page 594) so that the functional
equation (5) maps the space of bounded measurable functions into itself (Aliprantis & Border (1999), theorem 18.7,
page 593), and use additional arguments, which are available upon request, to show that this restriction can be met
by proposal strategies in the equilibrium characterized in the present study.
7strategy αi by a correspondence Ai : X ⇒ X, that maps each status quo s to an acceptance set
Ai (s) = {z ∈ X : αi(s,z) = yes}. Given Markov voting strategies Ai, i ∈ N, we can compute the
win set of s:
W (s) =
(
y ∈ X |
n X
i=1
IAi(s) (y) ≥ κ + 1
)
, (1)
where IA (y) is the indicator function. The win set W (s) ⊆ X contains the agreements that defeat
status quo s by majority rule.
Our equilibrium notion is that of Markov Perfect Nash (Maskin and Tirole (2001)) with a
standard reﬁnement on voting strategies:
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a set of proposal and voting strategies π∗
i , A∗
i, such that for all
i ∈ N, and for all status quo s ∈ X:
y ∈ A∗
i (s) ⇔ Ui (y) ≥ Ui (s), and (2)
π∗
i [argmax{Ui (x) | x ∈ W (s)} | s] = 1, (3)












and the continuation value v∗








[(1 − δ)ui (x) + δv∗
i (x)]πj [dx | s]. (5)
Equilibrium condition (2) amounts to the requirement that players vote yes to proposals if and
only if they weakly prefer them over the status quo s. Thus, we eliminate a – rather large – class
of uninteresting equilibria that involve majorities approving proposals not preferred over the status
quo (or vice versa) solely because individual players are not pivotal and, hence, are indiﬀerent
between their voting actions. Equilibrium condition (3) requires that committee members choose
proposals optimally when recognized. Observe that proposers are restricted to choose among the
set of alternatives that defeat the status quo, W(s). Since proposals y / ∈W(s) eﬀectively preserve
the status quo policy, and since the status quo s ∈W(s) for all s ∈X (by equilibrium condition (2)),
8this restriction does not impair the optimality of players’ proposal strategies.
We can now proceed to the analysis of the game. Our ﬁrst goal is to establish existence
of equilibrium. We accomplish this in sections 3 and 4. At the same time, we will obtain a
characterization of equilibrium outcomes. To pave the way for this analysis, we introduce necessary
notation. Partition the space of possible divisions of the budget into subsets ∆θ ⊂ ∆, where θ,
0 ≤ θ ≤ n − 1, indicates the number of players receiving zero share of the dollar, i.e., ∆θ =

x ∈ ∆ |
Pn
i=1 I{0} (xi) = θ
	








α is the set of all allocations of the dollar with α, or α + 1,..., or β players receiving zero.
The solution of the game we characterize is built from the intuition that equilibrium proposals
involve ‘minimum winning coalitions’ (Riker (1962)), such that at most κ + 1 players receive a
positive fraction of the dollar in each period. As a result, we conjecture that ∆n−1
κ is an absorbing
set, one that is reached in at most one period from any initial status quo allocation. Capitalizing
on the above conjecture, we execute our proof strategy in two steps. First, we derive equilibrium
strategies in closed form for an auxiliary game in which the space of possible agreements X = ∆n−1
κ .
In the second step, we extend the speciﬁed equilibrium strategies to the entire space of agreements
X = ∆. We execute the ﬁrst step in section 3, the second in section 4. In section 5 we discuss
properties of the equilibrium and additional results.
3 Equilibrium, X = ∆n−1
κ
Throughout this section, we will assume a status quo s ∈ ∆n−1
κ such that si+1 ≥ si, i = 1,...,n−1.
This is without loss of generality. Our goal is to derive an equilibrium when the space of possible
agreements is restricted to X = ∆n−1
κ . This equilibrium is obtained via a ‘conjecture and verify’
approach. The conjecture is that players with zero status quo allocation accept proposals in ∆n−1
κ+1
that allocate them zero.6 If this is the case, then any proposer i is able to obtain the approval of
κ other players in order to extract the whole dollar when the status quo s ∈ ∆n−1
κ+1 , or when the
6Indeed, we will show that players with zero status quo allocation may even strictly prefer such proposals in
equilibrium.
9status quo s ∈ ∆κ and si > 0. Observe that, with these proposal strategies, players’ continuation
value for any status quo s ∈ ∆n−1
κ+1 is given by
vi (s) = pi, i ∈ N, s ∈ ∆n−1
κ+1. (6)
With proposals speciﬁed as above, it remains to determine proposals when the status quo
s ∈ ∆κ and the proposer’s allocation is zero (i.e., proposer is i ∈ {1,...,κ}). In these cases, the
proposer must allocate a positive amount to one among players j ∈ {κ + 1,...,n} with sj > 0.
Of course, the proposer wishes to coalesce with the least expensive player which, intuitively, is
the player with the lowest positive status quo allocation, i.e., player j = κ + 1. We shall now
demonstrate that, depending on the exact value of the status quo, s ∈ ∆κ, it is not an equilibrium
strategy for the proposer i ∈ {1,...,κ} to allocate a positive amount to j = κ + 1 with probability
one. To see this is true, suppose that player κ + 1 is allocated an amount z whenever player
i ∈ {1,...,κ} is the proposer, with i retaining the rest of the dollar. The corresponding allocation
z is an element of ∆n−2, so that by equation (6) player κ + 1’s expected utility from the proposal
is Uκ+1(z) = (1 − δ)u(z) + δpκ+1. On the other hand, the expected utility from maintaining the
status quo s ∈ ∆κ is (given assumed proposal strategies)
Uκ+1(s) = (1 − δ)u(sκ+1) + δ((1 − δ)(
κ X
i=1




= (1 − δ)u(sκ+1) + δ(
κ X
i=1
pi(1 − δ)u(z) + pκ+1).







But, with these proposal strategies, players h = κ + 2,...,n, have expected payoﬀ
Uh(s) = (1 − δ)u(sh) + δph. As a consequence, proposer i ∈ {1,...,κ} can allocate an amount sh
to player h = κ + 2,...,n, in order to obtain h’s vote, and retain the rest of the dollar. Thus, for






10the assumed proposal strategies are not part of an equilibrium. Player κ+1 becomes too expensive
because she expects a positive allocation with probability
Pκ
i=1 pi while players h = κ + 2,...,n
expect zero from i ∈ {1,...,κ}, instead.
To reconcile these incentives with the underlying equilibrium conditions, we consider mixed
proposal strategies by proposers i ∈ {1,...,κ} for status quo s ∈ ∆κ. Speciﬁcally, players i ∈
{1,...,κ} mix by allocating an amount we denote by zb(s) to one among b players j ∈ {κ+1,...,κ+b}.








Furthermore, the integer b ∈ {1,...,κ + 1} is uniquely7 determined by two equilibrium conditions:
u(zb(s)) < u(sκ+b+1), if b = 1,...,κ, and (9)
u(zb(s)) ≥ u(sj),j = κ + 1,...,κ + b. (10)
Condition (9) is a generalization of condition (7) and requires that the utility received by each of
the b players κ + 1,...,κ + b is smaller than that demanded by player κ + b + 1. Thus, (9) ensures
proposers do not have an incentive to coalesce with any of players κ+b+1,...,n, instead of choosing
one among players κ + 1,...,κ + b. Condition (10) implies that players κ + 1,...,κ + b receive (and
demand) a larger amount than their status quo allocation sj, j ∈ {κ + 1,...,κ + b}, in order to
approve a proposal. On the one hand, these players’ utility stream in the event they become the
proposer in future periods is identical under the two alternatives, that is, these players can extract
the whole dollar in the future whether they accept the equilibrium proposal or retain the status
quo. On the other hand, upon accepting an equilibrium proposal, players j ∈ {κ + 1,...,κ + b}
receive zero by all proposers h 6= j in future periods, whereas, by maintaining the status quo, these
players expect to receive a positive amount as coalition partners with positive probability. Thus,
the proposed allocation must be larger than the status quo allocation in order for these players to
vote against the status quo.
Observe that we have so far proceeded to characterize proposal strategies under the intuitive
assumption that players wish to maximize their own allocation when proposing. Although this is
7As we establish in Lemma 2 in the Appendix, for every status quo s ∈ ∆κ, conditions (9) and (10) jointly
determine a unique number of players, b, that are potential recipients of positive allocations in equilibrium.
11indeed the case when stage payoﬀs are linear in individual allocations, it turns out not to be true,
in general, when stage utilities exhibit diminishing returns, i.e., when u00 < 0. In particular, the
equilibrium we have characterized with X = ∆n−1
κ requires certain restrictions on the concavity of
players’ stage preferences. Thus we defer a detailed discussion of the eﬀect of strict concavity until
section 5, and state the equilibrium under the restriction that stage payoﬀs are linear in individual
allocations:
Proposition 1 Assume X = ∆n−1
κ and u(x) = x. Consider allocations s ∈ ∆n−1
κ such that
si+1 ≥ si, i = 1,...,n − 1. There exists an equilibrium such that:
1. The proposer i extracts the whole dollar for all status quo s ∈ ∆n−1
κ+1, i ∈ N, or for all status
quo s ∈ ∆κ if i = κ + 1,...,n,








, j = κ + 1,...,κ + b. Proposal zij is such that z
ij
j = zb(s) and
z
ij
h = 0,h 6= i,j, and b satisﬁes (9) and (10).
3. The equilibrium expected utility, Ui(s),s ∈ ∆n−1
κ , is continuous and given by:
Ui(s) =

   
   
(1 − δ)u(si) + δpi if i = κ + b + 1,...,n,
(1 − δ)u(zb(s)) + δpi if i = κ + 1,...,κ + b,
δ(pi(1 − δ)u(1 − zb(s)) + δpi) if i = 1,...,κ.
(11)
Proof. See the appendix.
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward except, perhaps, in ascertaining the optimality
of players’ proposals, as the awkward shape of the objective function of the proposer implied by
(11) makes it hard to verify equilibrium condition (3). Nevertheless, when stage payoﬀs are linear
(u(x) = x) we can show (Lemma 3 in the Appendix) that the preferences represented by (11) have
similar properties with conventional preferences over a divide-the-dollar space, which ensures that
the proposals in Proposition 1 are optimal. We put these results to use in the following section,
where we focus the analysis on the linear case, u(x) = x, and we use Proposition 1 in order to
establish the existence of an equilibrium for the game with unrestricted agreement space X = ∆.
124 Equilibrium, X = ∆
Throughout this section, assume linear payoﬀs, i.e., u(x) = x. Suppose the game is played in the
manner we have characterized in Proposition 1 for all status quo s ∈ ∆n−1
κ . Since these strategies
render ∆n−1
κ ⊂ ∆ an absorbing set, in order to establish an equilibrium for the entire game we
must extend the proposal strategies of Proposition 1 to status quo s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 and ensure that the
resultant strategies deﬁned over all s ∈ ∆ are mutual best responses. It turns out that this is
possible by, at the same time, imposing considerable structure on these strategies. We develop
these arguments in detail in what follows.
First, we require that for each status quo s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 , the support of player i’s randomization
over proposals is contained in a set ∆(i) ⊂ ∆n−1
κ . Denote this randomization by b πi ∈ P[∆(i)]. Set
∆(i) = ∪C⊂N\{i}:|C|=κ{x ∈ ∆ : xi = 0,i ∈ C}, which is compact as the union of compact sets. In
words, ∆(i) contains allocations such that a bare majority of players including player i receive a
strictly positive amount, or allocations such that the set of players that receive a positive amount is
a minority. We can aﬀord this restriction8 on i’s proposals since (by (11)) if player i can implement
a proposal in ∆(i), then no allocation in ∆n−1
κ \ ∆(i) can improve on i’s utility. Assume that b πi
is such that all proposals in its support are approved and implemented. Then, if we denote the
vector of such randomizations by all players as b π ∈ ×i∈NP[∆(i)], players’ expected utility when
the status quo is s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 can be computed as:





Ui(z)b πh[dz],i ∈ N, (12)
where Ui(z) is given in equation (11) of Proposition 1. We emphasize that (12) is derived under
the assumption that players play according to the strategies in Proposition 1 for s ∈ ∆n−1
κ .
Using this expected utility, b Ui(b π,s), we obtain the proposals in ∆n−1
κ that are accepted by
player i ∈ N when the status quo is s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 and players use randomizations b π ∈ ×h∈NP[∆(h)]
as:
b Ai(b π,s) = {x ∈ ∆n−1
κ | Ui(x) ≥ b Ui(b π,s)}.
Deﬁne for each player i ∈ N, status quo s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 , and proposal lotteries b π ∈ ×h∈NP[∆(h)], the
8Indeed, we need it in order to obtain Lemma 4 in the Appendix, since non-emptiness of c Wi(b π,s) does not generally




c Wi(b π,s) = {y ∈ ∆(i) |
X
h6=i
I b Ah(b π,s)(y) ≥ κ}. (13)
Given our construction, c Wi(b π,s) contains those among proposals available to player i that are
approved by at least κ other players when the status quo is s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 , players use lotteries over
proposals given by b π, and the game is played according to Proposition 1 for status quo s ∈ ∆n−1
κ . In
Lemma 4 in the Appendix, we show that c Wi is a non-empty, upper-hemicontinuous correspondence
of b π, and that player i can always ﬁnd a proposal in c Wi(b π,s) such that i’s allocation is strictly
positive.
For each player i, we now deﬁne the correspondence of best response proposals
Mi(b π,s) = argmax{Ui(x) | x ∈ c Wi(b π,s)}. (14)
Suppose that for any initial or provisional randomizations b π, we pick new randomizations b π0 by
restricting players to choose optimal proposals (i.e., those in Mi(b π,s)). Thus, we deﬁne the corre-
spondence Bi(b π,s) = P[Mi(b π,s)], and require b π0
i ∈ Bi(b π,s). A signiﬁcant step in proving existence
of equilibrium is to establish the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume u(x) = x and consider any allocation s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 . The correspondence B :
×i∈NP[∆(i)] ⇒ ×i∈NP[∆(i)] deﬁned by B(b π,s) = ×n
h=1Bh(b π,s) has a ﬁxed point b π∗ ∈ B(b π∗,s).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that for any status quo s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 we can restrict players to propose in
∆n−1
κ in a consistent manner. In particular, players’ expectation about lotteries over proposals
are correct. Given these expectations, the proposals in the support of these lotteries are both
acceptable by κ players other than the proposer and maximize the proposer’s expected utility.
Deﬁne the correspondence B∗ : ∆κ−1
0 ⇒ ×i∈NP[∆(i)] that maps status quo s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 to the ﬁxed
points b π∗ ∈ ×i∈NP[∆(i)] of B(b π,s). Combining a selector from B∗ with the proposal strategies of
Proposition 1, we obtain proposal strategies π∗
i : ∆ → P[∆], for each player i ∈ N. In Proposition
2 we show that these proposal strategies form part of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose X = ∆, and u(x) = x. Combine any selector from B∗ with the proposal
strategies from Proposition 1. The resultant proposal strategies π∗
i : ∆ → P[∆], i ∈ N, form part
14of an equilibrium. Thus, at least one equilibrium exists.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We have established a very counter-intuitive equilibrium such that proposers are able to even-
tually extract the whole dollar in the long-run. In order to understand the forces behind this
counter-intuitive result, it is useful to decompose players’ incentives generated by a given alloca-
tion into two eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect arises from players’ utility stream as coalition partners to other
proposers: a small allocation reduces a player’s immediate utility, as well as the demands of that
player as a voter in future periods. The second eﬀect stems from players’ expected utility stream
from their role as proposers. In this regard, holding a player’s own allocation ﬁxed, there is an
incentive to favor allocations that are least equitable: the less equitable the status quo, the easier it
is for the proposer to extract more of the dollar (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal, 1978). In equilibrium,
the second eﬀect dominates. Because of majority rule, some players in the minority are excluded
from equilibrium allocations. Once a player receives an allocation equal to zero, there is no future
loss or gain to be had for this player in her capacity as a coalition partner. Thus, the only active
incentive for that player is that of a proposer, and this incentive sustains the inequitable allocations.
Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium, but equilibria with the stated properties
need not be unique, although all such equilibria are essentially identical in that they involve the
same expected payoﬀs for allocations in the absorbing set ∆n−1
κ . Note that Proposition 2 does not
rule out the existence of other equilibria that are not payoﬀ equivalent.
5 Equilibrium Properties & Discussion
In this section we discuss properties of the equilibrium established in Proposition 2 and derive
certain implications and additional results. We start with a discussion of equilibrium dynamics.
5.1 Equilibrium Dynamics
In combination with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 provides a sharp description of the equilibrium.
The Markov process over policy outcomes induced by this equilibrium is depicted graphically in
Figure 1. Note that if a decision x ∈ ∆κ prevails in period t = 1, then there is probability
e p =
Pn
i=1 I{0}(xi)pi that a decision in ∆n−2 is reached in period t = 2. Thus, within a maximum
15Figure 1: From any initial status quo allocation, equilibrium decisions are absorbed in ∆n−1 in
at most three periods. ˜ p is the sum of recognition probabilities of players with zero status quo
allocation when the status quo s ∈ ∆κ.
of three periods all proposers extract the entire dollar, i.e., all equilibrium allocations are drawn
from ∆n−1. Note the diﬀerence with the corresponding distribution in the version of this game
with n = 3 players analyzed by Kalandrakis (2004). With three players, it is possible that decisions
are drawn outside the absorbing set ∆n−1 with positive probability for any ﬁnite period t. This is
because for certain status quo such that a single player, say i, receives zero in period t, i cannot
extract the whole dollar. Hence, if i is recognized in period t, the status quo in period t + 1 must
also involve a single player, say j, receiving zero. The same is possible in t + 2, if j is recognized
in period t + 1, etc. On the contrary, when n ≥ 5, there always exists a bare minority of κ players
other than the proposer that have zero status quo allocation in period t = 3.
Figure 1 allows for the possibility that the equilibrium Markov process can be absorbed in
∆n−1 even from status quo s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 . In fact, this is possible even if all players receive a positive
status quo allocation. We illustrate this in the following example:
Example 1 Assume u(x) = x, κ = 2 (n = 5), pi = 1
5, i ∈ N, and initial status quo s =
(ε,ε, 1
6, 5
12 − ε, 5
12 − ε) ∈ ∆0. For small ε > 0, equilibrium proposals are identical to those that
prevail for status quo s0 = (0,0, 1
6, 5
12, 5
12) ∈ ∆2 in Proposition 1. Speciﬁcally, players j = 3,4,5







163 and retaining the rest of the dollar. Indeed, player i’s, i = 1,2, expected utility from the status
quo with the above proposal strategies is given by
Ui(s) = (1 − δ)ε + δ(
(1−δ)
5 (1 − 5
6(5−2δ)) + δpi) = (1 − δ)ε −
δ(1−δ)
6(5−2δ) + δpi,
so that Ui(s) < δpi for suﬃciently small ε.
In example 1 all successful proposals have at most two players receiving a positive fraction of the
dollar, even though all status quo allocations are positive, i.e., si > 0 for all i ∈ N. Furthermore,
players 1 and 2 strictly prefer a proposal that allocates the whole dollar to j = 3,4,5 over the
status quo s. This is because replacing the status quo s ∈ ∆0 produces the externality of reducing
the future coalition building costs for players 1 and 2.
5.2 Proposer Power & McKelvey’s Dictatorial Agenda Setter
Proposition 2 holds for all possible values of recognition probabilities, pi, i ∈ N. Thus, with linear
payoﬀs u(x) = x, players’ long-run equilibrium expected payoﬀ can be any fraction of the available
‘pie’, depending on recognition probabilities pi, i ∈ N. If we take the perspective that a player’s
expected payoﬀ represents her power in this setting, then Proposition 2 yields a partial extension
of the result of Kalandrakis (2006) on the relation between recognition probabilities and political
power: for any level of power x ∈ ∆ and any discount factor, there exists an assignment of proposal
probabilities, so that players’ equilibrium level of power in the long-run coincides with x.9
The case when pi = 1 for some player i is theoretically signiﬁcant as it yields an equilibrium
derivation of dictatorial agenda setting under the institution assumed by McKelvey (1976), (1979).
McKelvey’s dictator uses a sequence of binary votes between the status quo and appropriate pro-
posals. Each proposal is implemented and becomes the status quo in the next round of proposal
making until the proposer eventually implements her ideal point. In his analysis, voters approve
these proposals to their eventual detriment, because they are assumed to be myopic (δ = 0). In the
present setup, this type of dictatorial agenda setting is obtained as part of a Nash equilibrium, in
fact a Markov Perfect equilibrium, under the assumption that voters are farsighted, and for every
value of the discount factor δ < 1. Remarkably, it only takes two periods for player i to extract the
9This is a partial extension because Kalandrakis (2006) considers all possible voting rules and all assymmetric
discount factors. Furthermore, his analysis is obtained under a restriction to stationary equilibria in pure strategies.
17whole dollar, while in general it may take three periods for absorption in ∆n−1 in the equilibrium
of Proposition 2. In particular, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 (Smooth Dictator) Assume X = ∆, pi = 1, u(x) = x and any initial status
quo s ∈ X. There exists an equilibrium such that i extracts the whole dollar in every period t ≥ 2.
Proof. Consider any equilibrium among those shown to exist in Proposition 2. By construction,
the proposer i with pi = 1 implements some x ∈ ∆(i) in period t = 1. Now in period t = 2, we have
st = x, and at least κ players other than i with zero status quo allocation. Thus, according to the
proposal strategies in Proposition 1, the proposer i can extract the whole dollar with probability
one in period t = 2.
In order to illustrate how the agenda setting established in Proposition 3 can be achieved,
consider the following ﬁve-player example.
Example 2 Assume u(x) = x, κ = 2, p1 = 1, ph = 0, h = 2,...,5, and an initial status quo




4). Player 1 needs two votes in addition to her own in order to have a proposal
approved. Consider a proposal strategy such that player 1 allocates an amount zi = zj = z = 1
2(2−δ)
to two randomly chosen players i,j ∈ {2,...,5} and retains z1 = 1−δ
2−δ. From (11) and the fact that
ph = 0, h ∈ {2,...,5} we calculate expected payoﬀs from such proposals z ∈ ∆2 as Uh(z) = (1−δ)zh,
h ∈ {2,...,5}. On the other hand, the expected payoﬀ of players h ∈ {2,...,5} from the status quo,
s, is given by Uh(s) = (1 − δ)sh + δvh(s). With the above proposal strategy for player 1, and since
each player h ∈ {2,...,5} has probability 1




2(2−δ), h ∈ {2,...,5}. Thus, in period t = 1 the speciﬁed proposals z ∈∆2 are optimal and
receive majority approval. Henceforth, player 1 can extract the whole dollar in all periods t = 2,....
Note that the proposer in example 2 receives 1−δ
2−δ in the ﬁrst period, an amount that tends to zero
when players are patient (δ → 1). Since players 2 to 5 are recognized with probability zero in future
periods, they require a higher compensation to overturn the status quo. On the other hand, player
1 is content with a low allocation in period 1 since that allocation will allow player 1 to extract
the dollar in all future periods. In fact, player 1 strictly prefers any allocation z that excludes two
other players over the status quo s (even if z1 = 0).
185.3 Composition of Equilibrium Coalitions
This discussion points to a more general pattern concerning the eﬀect of probabilities of recognition.
Players with high probability of being recognized are more willing to accept a ‘bad’ proposal in the
current period, since it allows them to extract more of the dollar in the following period, ceteris
paribus. In fact, it is possible that such players are included in the winning coalition with higher
probability for certain status quo, as we show in example 3. Before we state this example we deﬁne
a proxy of the ‘cost’ or demand of a player:
Deﬁnition 2 Consider an equilibrium from Proposition 2 with equilibrium expected payoﬀs U∗
h(s),
h ∈ N. The demand of player h ∈ N is deﬁned as dh (s) = (1 − δ)−1 max{0,U∗
h (s) − δph)}.
In eﬀect, the demand of player h is the allocation necessary for h to accept a proposal in ∆n−1
κ+1.
Now consider the following:
Example 3 Assume u(x) = x, κ = 3, δ = 9
10, pl = 4
15, l = 1,2, p3 = 1
5, pl = 1
15, l = 4,...,7, and









. Note that s3 = s4 but p3 > p4. Consider proposal
strategies such that players l = 4,...,7, allocate z3 = d3 (s), and retain zl = 1 − d3 (s), player 3
allocates z4 = d4 (s) and retains z3 = 1−d4 (s), while players l = 1,2 allocate zh = dh (s),h = 3,4,
and retain zl = 1 − d3 (s) − d4 (s). With these proposal strategies, demands dh (s),h ∈ N, are
obtained using (11) as solutions to:
d3 (s) = 1
14 + δ
 1





d4 (s) = 1
14 + δ
  1





dl (s) = 2
7 + δ
  1














It is straightforward to verify that d1 (s) = d1 (s) = 0 < d3 (s) = 200
1477 < d4 (s) = 275
1477 < dl (s) = 410
1477,
l = 5,...,7. Thus, the above described proposals are optimal and player 3 is included in the winning
coalition with higher probability than player 4 even while p3 = 1
5 > p4 = 1
15 and s3 = s4.
In the model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), a higher recognition probability implies both a
higher cost of inclusion in the coalition (higher demand), and a smaller probability of inclusion
19in the winning coalition (see Eraslan (2002)). Let µl
h(s) ≤ ph be the probability that player h
makes proposals z such that U∗
l (z) ≥ U∗
l (s), i.e., such that player l 6= h is included in the winning
coalition. Contrary to the eﬀect of probabilities of recognition on a players’ likelihood of inclusion
in the winning coalition in the Baron and Ferejohn model, we have just shown:
Proposition 4 There exist probabilities of recognition satisfying pi > pj for two players i,j ∈ N,
and an equilibrium (as in Proposition 2) for the associated game, such that for some status quo








In fact, when it comes to equilibrium demands we can show a stronger result, i.e., that dj (s) ≥
di (s) for all players i 6= j with pi > pj and all status quo s ∈ ∆ such that si = sj.10 We emphasize
that both in the present study and in the Baron and Ferejohn model players are better oﬀ with
higher recognition probabilities. Put otherwise, in our analysis recognition probabilities have (a) a
positive eﬀect on players’ long-run expected payoﬀ (Proposition 1, Proposition 2); and, (b) under
certain conditions, a negative eﬀect on players demand and a positive eﬀect on players’ probability
of being included in the winning coalition. Thus, it is the relation between recognition probabilities
and the composition of equilibrium coalitions (not equilibrium expected payoﬀs) that is diﬀerent
between Baron and Ferejohn type of bargaining and the fully dynamic model we analyze in this
study.
5.4 Diminishing Returns
The equilibrium established in section 4 requires linear payoﬀs, (u(x) = x). Thus, the equilibrium is
Pareto optimal, so that equilibrium allocations, and any plan of division of the dollar for that matter,
are eﬃcient from an economic perspective even though they may imply a politically disturbing
inequality of payoﬀs. This conclusion is no longer valid if players’ stage utility, u, is strictly concave.
Under this assumption, the equilibrium is obviously ineﬃcient. Since u(pi) > pi, pi ∈ (0,1), every
player i ∈ N strictly prefers a constant share pi of the dollar after period t = 3 rather than receiving
the whole dollar with probability pi ∈ (0,1). Thus, strict concavity generates incentives for more
equitable allocations, and one may question whether the equilibrium in Proposition 2 survives in
10The proof is lengthy and tedious because of the complications that arise by the non-standard form of players’
expected utility (11) when players propose allocations z ∈∆κ (see Kalandrakis, 2003). For the same reason, it is not
necessarily true that a player with lower demand is included in the winning coalition with higher probability, exactly
due to the shape of equilibrium expected utility for allocations z ∈∆κ.
20the presence of these incentives. Consistent with this intuition, we will show that the proposal
strategies prescribed in Proposition 1 are not optimal if players’ stage preferences are suﬃciently
concave.
We will provide two examples in order to substantiate this claim. In the ﬁrst of the two
examples, the proposer prefers to deviate from proposals prescribed in Proposition 1 (assuming
players subsequently adhere to the strategies prescribed in that equilibrium) in the following way:
instead of buying the vote of a single player among those with a positive allocation by exclusively
giving a positive amount to that player, the proposer is better oﬀ allocating an equal amount to
κ + 1 players including herself.
Example 4 Assume pi = 1
n for all i ∈ N and an initial status quo s = (0,...,0, 1
κ+1,..., 1
κ+1) ∈ ∆κ.
Note that b = κ+1 satisﬁes conditions (9) and (10) for s. Thus, according to the proposal strategies





) to one of players κ+1,...,n,
and retains 1−zb(s). Player i’s utility from this proposal is given by (1−δ)u(1−zb(s))+ δ
n. Now
suppose stage utility function u satisﬁes
(κ + 1)u( 1
κ+1)










2) ⇔ u(zb(s)) > u(1
2) ⇔ u(zb(s)) > u(1 − zb(s)) , the ﬁrst step
obtained by substituting from (8). Thus, player i can improve her utility by proposing x ∈ ∆κ with
xi = 1
κ+1 and xh = 1







n, if the game is subsequently played according to the proposal strategies
speciﬁed in Proposition 1, which is larger than (1 − δ)u(1 − zb(s)) + δ
n.
Thus, for the proposal strategies in Proposition 1 to form an equilibrium when u00 < 0 and
recognition probabilities are equal, we must have:
(κ + 1)u( 1
κ+1)






Figure 2 depicts a situation where condition (15) is violated when κ = 2.
Now consider a diﬀerent example:







Example 5 Assume pi = 1
n, i ∈ N, and an initial status quo s = (0,...,0,s,...,s,1 − κs) ∈ ∆κ,




< u(1−κs). Now b = κ satisﬁes conditions (9) and (10). Thus, according




one of players κ + 1,...,n − 1, and retains 1 − zb(s). Now suppose that u is such that
u(κs) <
κu(s)
κ − δ κ
n
.




⇔ κs < zb(s) ⇔ u(1 − κs) > u(1 − zb(s)). Thus, if the game
is subsequently played according to the strategies in Proposition 1, the prescribed proposal is not
optimal since player i ∈ {1,...,κ} can propose x ∈ ∆κ with xi = 1 − κs and xh = s to κ more
players and get higher utility.
In a manner similar to example 4, in example 5 the proposer can improve her expected utility
by allocating an equal amount to κ other players rather than allocating a positive amount to a single
player. Thus, we obtain another necessary condition for the proposal strategies in Proposition 1 to
22be part of an equilibrium in the presence of diminishing returns, namely:
κu(s)
κ − δ κ
n
≤ u(κs), if s is such that
κu(s)
κ − δ κ
n
< u(1 − κs). (16)
Note that both conditions (15) and (16) eﬀectively impose a bound on the steepness of stage utility
u(x) at small fractions of the dollar. When either condition is violated, the immediate gain from
extracting larger shares of the dollar diminishes so much, so that such a gain is not preferred over
the option of receiving a smaller amount in the current period with a prospect of also receiving
a positive fraction in the future as a coalition partner. Note that for ﬁxed utility function, u,
conditions (15) and (16) are easier met when the committee is larger (larger κ). Both conditions
(15) and (16) are always satisﬁed in the case of risk neutrality, u(x) = x. In fact, we can show that
these conditions are suﬃcient for the strategies described in Proposition 1 to form an equilibrium,
assuming recognition probabilities are equal.
Proposition 5 Assume X = ∆n−1
κ , pi = 1
n for all i ∈ N, and u00 < 0. The proposal strategies
in Proposition 1 form part of an equilibrium under these assumptions if and only if u satisﬁes
conditions (15) and (16).
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 5 points to another instance of the discrepancy between models without recurring
policy decisions and the model we analyze. In particular, in a model with the same institutions
as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Harrington (1990), shows that higher degrees of risk aversion
increase the power of the proposer. In contrast, we have shown that an equilibrium that is quite
favorable for the proposer collapses when risk aversion is high.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed a dynamic majority rule bargaining game over a distributive policy space with
an endogenous status quo policy. Although such an equilibrium may fail to exist for games in the
class we analyze, we established existence of a (reﬁned) Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium. The
equilibrium produces a number of novel and in many instances counter-intuitive ﬁndings. First, we
have shown that dynamic bargaining over a distributive policy space does not guarantee suﬃcient
23strategic incentives for players to converge to equitable allocations both within and across periods.
In fact, the long-term dynamics induced in the equilibrium we characterized are identical to the
dynamics that would prevail in a world were players are myopic or non-strategic. Second, in
Proposition 3 we obtained the grim consequences of McKelvey’s (1976), (1979), dictatorial agenda
setting construction despite the fact that voters are farsighted.
In some regards, the results of our analysis leave a more upbeat note than many interpretations
of the conclusions of social choice theory. Instead of encompassing the entire space of alternatives,
the long-run absorbing set of possible divisions in the characterized equilibrium is a ﬁnite set. Thus,
instead of chaos, there are at most n possible policy outcomes after period 3. In addition, there is
ex ante positive probability equal to
Pn
i=1 p2
i that the same decision prevails between consecutive
periods, so that we don’t observe perpetual instability of decisions in equilibrium. We emphasize
that these results do not depend on the restriction to Markov equilibria. The equilibrium we
characterize, and many more, exists a fortiori if we consider weaker equilibrium notions such as
subgame perfect or simple Nash equilibrium. Also, these results do not depend on the way we
resolve voter indiﬀerence at the critical voting period when alternatives that allocate zero to more
than a majority of players prevail for the ﬁrst time. As illustrated in example 1, players that vote
yes in these cases and receive zero may strictly prefer the proposal over the status quo, despite the
fact that they receive a smaller allocation.
Under certain restrictions, the inequality of long-run equilibrium allocations persists even in
the presence of diminishing returns on players’ stage preferences, in which case the equilibrium is
ineﬃcient. On the other hand, we also show players’ incentives for sharing the budget do manifest
themselves in the presence of suﬃcient concavity in stage preferences, since the characterized inef-
ﬁcient equilibrium does not survive when such concavity is marked. Besides the counter-intuitive
nature of the equilibrium, the signiﬁcance of our ﬁndings also stems from the fact that in many
respects they diﬀer from results in other studies that impose similar equilibrium restrictions. For
example, if we consider similar institutions and ideological policy spaces (e.g., Baron (1996), Baron
and Herron (2003)), we obtain long-run policy dynamics concentrated at the center of the policy
space. If, instead, we maintain the distributive space of our analysis but substitute the institutional
arrangements with the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) closed rule, we get a diﬀerent composition of
winning coalitions in regards to probabilities of recognition (Proposition 4 vs. Eraslan, (2002)) or
the eﬀect of risk aversion (Proposition 5 vs. Harrington (1990)). The ﬁrst comparison suggests that
24at least some aspects of our theories of legislative politics cannot be independent of the underlying
policy space. The second comparison highlights the signiﬁcance (at least theoretically) of modeling
choices that trade between analytical tractability and realism by assuming legislative interaction
that ceases after a decision is reached or incorporate dynamic interaction with endogenous status
quo.
APPENDIX
In this appendix we ﬁrst state and prove two Lemmas (Lemmas 2 and 3), which are used in the
proofs of Proposition 1, Lemma 1, and Proposition 2. We start with Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 Consider any s ∈ ∆n−1
κ , any stage utility function u with u
00
≤ 0, and assume without
loss of generality that si+1 ≥ si, i = 1,...,n − 1.
(i) There exists unique b, 1 ≤ b ≤ κ + 1, that satisﬁes (9) and (10).
(ii) If b satisﬁes (9) and (10), then
u(zb(s)) ≤
(κ + 1)u( 1
κ+1)




Proof. We start by showing the following equivalence:
[u(zb(s)) < u(sκ+b+1) ⇔ u(zb+1(s)) < u(sκ+b+1)],b = 1,...,κ. (17)
Indeed, making use of (8) we write u(zb(s)) < u(sκ+b+1) ⇔
Pκ+b





j=κ+1 u(sj) < (b + 1 − δ
Pκ
i=1 pi)u(sκ+b+1) ⇔ u(zb+1(s)) < u(sκ+b+1).
The contra-positive of (17) also gives us
[u(zb(s)) ≥ u(sκ+b+1) ⇔ u(zb+1(s)) ≥ u(sκ+b+1)],b = 1,...,κ. (18)
Now, to show existence of b satisfying (9) and (10) consider the algorithm:
1. Start with b = 1; if u(z1(s)) < u(sκ+2) then b = 1.
2. If u(zb(s)) ≥ u(sκ+b+1), consider b0 = b + 1. (18) ensures that b0 satisﬁes (10). If b0 also satisﬁes
(9) then stop.
253. Otherwise, if u(zb0(s)) ≥ u(sκ+b0+1) proceed as in 2 until u(zb(s)) < u(sκ+b+1) for some b ≤ κ.
4. If condition (9), u(zb(s)) < u(sκ+b+1) fails for all b ≤ κ, then u(zκ(s)) ≥ u(sn), and b = κ + 1.
Thus b exists.
To show uniqueness, suppose there exist distinct, b, b0 with b < b0 that satisfy (9) and (10) to get
a contradiction. Then, we have u(zb(s)) < u(sκ+b+1) from (9) and certainly u(zb0(s)) ≥ u(sκ+b+λ),
λ = 1,...,(b0 − b) from (10). From the last (b0 − b) inequalities we deduce































which contradicts condition (9) for b. This concludes the proof of part (i).
To show part (ii), we will ﬁrst show that u(zb(s)) ≤ u(zκ+1(s)). This is trivial if b = κ + 1, so
consider the case b ≤ κ. Then, by condition (9) and the fact that si+1 ≥ si, i = 1,...,n−1 we have
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⇔
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26Thus, we conclude that u(zb(s)) ≤ u(zκ+1(s)) when b = 1,...,κ + 1 satisﬁes (9) and (10), as we
wished to show. Now, concavity of u implies that
u(zκ+1(s)) ≤
(κ + 1)u( 1
κ+1)




which completes the proof of part (ii) and the Lemma.
We continue by showing Lemma 3 which ensures that, starting with any allocation in ∆n−1
κ ,
the preferences represented by (11) are such so that we can incrementally reduce the allocation of
one player in order to increase the payoﬀ of a bare minority that contains all players receiving a
positive amount in the original allocation:
Lemma 3 Assume u(x) = x and preferences over ∆n−1
κ given by (11). Consider allocation x ∈
∆n−1
κ and let C = {h ∈ N : xh > 0}. For every ε > 0, every coalition K ⊂ N with |K| = κ + 1
and C ⊆ K, and every i ∈ C, there exists y ∈ ∆n−1
κ such that Uj(y) > Uj(x), j ∈ K \ {i}, and
|Ui(y) − Ui(x)| < ε.
Proof. If x ∈ ∆n−1
κ+1, then Uh(x) = (1 − δ)xh + δph for all h ∈ N, and the proof is straightfor-
ward: set yi = xi − κη, where κη > 0, and η is as small as is necessary for |Ui(y) − Ui(x)| < ε to
hold, and set yj = xj + η for all j ∈ K \ {i}, and set yh = xh = 0 for all h / ∈ K.
Thus, it remains to consider x ∈ ∆κ. Assume without loss of generality that xh+1 ≥ xh,
h = 1,...,n − 1, so that C = K = {κ + 1,...,n}, and assume b satisﬁes (9) and (10) for x. There
are two cases:





j = κ + 1,...,κ + b, and yj = xj + η, for j ∈ {κ + b + 1,...,n} \ {i}. For suﬃciently small η,















+ δpj = Uj(x),j = κ + 1,...,κ + b,
while Uj(y) = Uj(x) + η, for j ∈ {κ + b + 1,...,n} \ {i}.





h/ ∈K ph. Note that γ = (
Pκ+b








h/ ∈K ph > 0. Thus it is feasible to set yi = γ−κη, with η > 0 and suﬃciently small,









h/ ∈K ph) + δpi, versus Ui(x) = (1 − δ)zb(x) + δpi,
while Uj(y) = Uj(x) + η, j ∈ K − {i}.
Next, we prove Propositions 1 and 5. Many arguments in the two proofs are identical, so we
economize on space by presenting both proofs at the same time. We explicitly identify cases when
either of the two propositions requires special arguments.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 5. To ensure that the associated proposals are well deﬁned,
note that by part (i) of Lemma 2, b exists and is unique. Also, part (ii) of Lemma 2 ensures
that zb(s) < 1
2. In particular, in the case of Proposition 1 with u(x) = x we have from part (ii)
of Lemma 2 that zb(s) ≤ 1
κ+1−δ < 1







2 when u00 < 0 and pi = 1
n for all i ∈ N. Thus it is feasible
to construct proposals zij ∈ ∆n−2 with z
ij
j = zb(s). Lastly, to show that mixing probabilities lie




i = 1 and that µ
j
i ≥ 0











i=1 pi = 1, after substitution from (8).
Continuity of Ui(s) follows easily either by direct arguments or by the fact that proposal
probabilities and proposals are continuous functions of s. Next we show that the expected utilities
in (11) are derived from the described proposal strategies and are such that all proposals are
accepted when players play stage-undominated voting strategies. As already argued in stating (6),
we have vi(s) = pi for all s ∈ ∆κ+b, b = 1,...,κ+1. Further note that for such status quo, b satisﬁes
(9) and (10), zb(s) = sκ+b = 0 and the expected payoﬀ in (11) reduces to Ui(s) = (1−δ)u(si)+δpi
as required by (4). Now consider s ∈ ∆κ. Since proposals oﬀered for such status quo, zij, belong in
∆n−1









After substitution for µ
j




   
   
pi if i = κ + b + 1,...,n,
(1 − δ)δ−1(u(zb(s)) − u(si)) + pi if i = κ + 1,...,κ + b,
(1 − δ)piu(1 − zb(s)) + δpi if i = 1,...,κ.
Direct application of the deﬁnition in equation (4) using the above yields equation (11) as desired.
Note that with the expected payoﬀs in (11) all players i ∈ {1,...,κ} accept any proposal z ∈ ∆n−1
κ+1
with zi = 0 for every s ∈ ∆n−1
κ , while the same is true for players j ∈ {κ + 1,...,κ + b} as long as
28zj = zb(s). Thus proposals are approved by majorities.
To complete the proof of the proposition, it remains to show optimality of proposals. We pursue
a proof that covers both cases (Proposition 1 and 5). Note that (1 − δ)u(1) + δpi = max{Ui(x) :
x ∈ ∆n−1
κ }. Thus, since extracting the entire dollar is a global maximum, we only need consider
cases when the proposer does not extract the entire dollar. This occurs for status quo s ∈ ∆κ and
proposer i with si = 0. So assume:
• a status quo s ∈ ∆κ,
• a proposer i with si = 0, and
• an integer b that uniquely satisﬁes (9) and (10) for s.
Prescribed equilibrium proposals zih∈ ∆n−2, h = κ + 1,...,κ + b for proposer i are optima among
feasible alternatives in ∆n−1
κ+1, because maximization for the proposer among alternatives in ∆n−1
κ+1
clearly amounts to maximizing her stage allocation. Thus, we need to show that there exists no
y ∈ argmax{Ui(z) : z ∈ W(s)
T
∆κ}, with Ui(y) > Ui(zih). So further assume, in order to get a
contradiction, that there exists y ∈ W(s) ∩ ∆κ such that Ui(y) > Ui(zih). From the assumption
that Ui (y) > Ui
 
zih
and the fact that zb(s) ≤ 1




h = zb(s). (19)
Without loss of generality relabel players so that yl+1 ≥ yl, l = 1,...,n−1, and let integer b0 uniquely
satisfy (9) and (10) for y. After relabeling, we have i = n from (19) and the fact that zb0(y) ≤ 1
2,
the latter again from part (ii) of Lemma 2 and (15). We must also have Uj (y) ≥ Uj (s) > δpj for
at least one player j with sj > 0 else y / ∈ W(s). Since sj > 0, (11) and (9) imply that
(1 − δ)−1(Uj(y) − δpj) ≥ u(zb(s)) > 0, (20)
so yj > 0 and, again after relabeling players, j ∈ {κ + 1,...,n − 1}. We now have three cases all of
which lead to a contradiction emanating from the assumption that Ui(y) > Ui(zih).
Case 1 (j > κ+b0): Then from (11) we have Uj (y) = (1−δ)u(yj)+δpj ≥ Uj (s). Thus, from
(19) and (20) we deduce yj ≥ zb(s) = zih
h . But then from (19) we have 1 − zih
h = zih
i < yi < 1 − yj,
which yields zih
h > yj, a contradiction.






l=1 pl + δpj.





l=1 pl ≥ u(zb (s)). This last inequality implies that if u is linear then
Pn−1
l=κ+1 yl > zb(s), while if u is strictly concave with pl = 1
n for all l ∈ N, we have from concavity









≤ u(κy), where y =
Pn−1
l=κ+1 yl
κ . From (19) we
have yi > zih
i ≥ zih
h = 1 − zih
i > 1 − yi =
Pn−1




h=κ+1 yh) > u(zb(s)), a contradiction.












l=1 pl ≥ u(zb (s)) = u(zih
h ), which implies zih
i = 1 − zih
h > 1 − yκ+b0+1 >
yi ⇒ Ui(y) < Ui(zih), which is the ﬁnal contradiction.
We continue with Lemma 4 that is used in the proof of Lemma 1. The two Lemmas in
combination yield the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 4 Assume u(x) = x. Consider any player i ∈ N and any allocation s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 . c Wi(b π,s)
deﬁned in (13) is non-empty and upper-hemicontinuous as a correspondence of b π. Furthermore,
for all b π ∈ ×i∈NP[∆(i)], there exists x ∈ c Wi(b π,s) such that xi > 0.
Proof. The proof consists of four steps. First, we establish a lower bound on b Ui (b π,s). Then, we
use this bound to show that the sum of the demands of an appropriate set of players is less than
unity. In steps 3 and 4 we use these results to prove the Lemma.
Claim 1: For all i ∈ N,
b Ui (b π,s) >
−δ2(1 − δ)pi (1 − pi)
κ
+ δ2pi. (21)
From (11) we have
min{Ui (x) : x ∈∆(i)} = δpi. (22)
Also from (11) we determine the minimum possible payoﬀ that can be received by player i when
other players propose, i.e.,
min

Ui (x) : x ∈∆n−1
κ
	
= δ(pi(1 − δ)(1 − zb(x)) + δpi) = −δpi(1 − δ)zb(x) + δpi,
30for some x ∈∆κ \ ∆(i) that results in zb (x) (b satisfying (9) and (10)) that is as large as possible.






Ui (x) : x ∈∆n−1
κ
	




We can now obtain the desired bound on b Ui (b π,s) by combining (22) and (23). In particular, since
i is the proposer with probability pi we have from (12):
b Ui (b π,s) > (1 − δ)si + δ









But the right hand side is larger or equal to δ





. Hence we have
b Ui (b π,s) >
−δ2(1 − δ)pi (1 − pi)
κ
+ δ2pi, all i ∈ N,
as we wished to show.
For the next step we deﬁne b dj = (1 − δ)−1 max
n
0, b Ui (b π,s) − δpi
o
. We show:
Claim 2: Assume without loss of generality that b dh+1 ≥ b dh, h = 1,...,n − 1. Then
κ+1 X
h=2
b dh < 1.
Let l = min
n
i ∈ N : b di > 0
o
. Obviously, if l > κ + 1 then
Pκ+1
h=2 b dh = 0, so we only need
consider cases with l ≤ κ + 1. Note that
Pn















h=2 b dh < 1 follows trivially if l = 1. It remains to
consider the case κ + 1 ≥ l > 1, whence
n X
h=l





b Uh (b π,s) − δph

.
We now invoke (21) to deduce that
n X
h=l




















κ + 2 − l












,l = 2,...,κ + 1.
Further note that
Pl−1














κ + 2 − l









,l = 2,...,κ + 1.
The right hand side of this inequality is equal to 1 when l = 2, and decreases with l. Since
Pκ+1
h=l b dh =
Pκ+1
h=2 b dh (because b dh = 0,h < l, and l > 1) we have shown that
Pκ+1
h=2 b dh < 1, as
desired.
Claim 3: c Wi (b π,s) is non-empty and contains x ∈∆(i) such that xi > 0. By Claim 2, (still
assuming b dh+1 ≥ b dh) we can construct proposal x ∈∆(i) with xh = b dh, h ∈ {1,...,κ + 1} \ {i} if
i ∈ {1,...,κ}, or xh = b dh, h ∈ {1,...,κ} if i ∈ {κ + 1,...,n}. Since
Pκ+1
h=2 b dh < 1, this is possible,
and i can retain xi > 0. By (11) and the deﬁnition of b dh we easily infer that Uh(x) ≥ b Uh (b π,s) so
that x ∈ c Wi (b π,s).
We complete the proof with a last step.
Claim 4: c Wi (b π,s) is upper-hemicontinuous as a correspondence of b π. To establish upper-
hemicontinuity, notice that Ui (x), b Ui (b π,s) are continuous in x, b π respectively, thus b Ai (b π,s) has
closed graph for all i ∈ N. By extension, c Wi (b π,s) has closed graph, since ﬁnite unions and in-
tersections of closed sets are closed. Thus, since it also has compact Hausdorﬀ range, c Wi (b π,s)
is upper-hemicontinuous, by the Closed Graph Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (1999), 16.12, p.
529).
Armed with Lemma 4, we prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is by application of Glicksberg’s (1952) ﬁxed point theorem.
To ensure the conditions of the theorem are met, it suﬃces to show that Mi(b π,s) is a non-empty,
upper-hemicontinous correspondence with respect to b π. If this is true, then, since Bi(b π,s) =
P[Mi(b π,s)], Bi and B are non-empty, upper-hemicontinuous, and convex valued by theorem 16.14
of Aliprantis and Border (1999), page 530, so that a ﬁxed point exists.
32Since c Wi(b π,s) is non-empty and compact, Mi(b π,s) is non-empty. Thus, it remains to show
that Mi(b π,s) is upper-hemicontinuous. Because c Wi(b π,s) need not be lower-hemicontinuous,11 we
prove upper-hemicontinuity directly instead of following the typical line of proof that invokes the
Theorem of the Maximum. In particular, since Mi has compact Hausdorﬀ range it suﬃces for our
purposes to show that Mi(b π,s) has closed graph (by the Closed Graph Theorem, Aliprantis and
Border (1999), 16.12, p. 529). Suppose Mi(b π,s) does not have closed graph to get a contradiction.
Then there exists a sequence
(b πk,xk) ∈ GrMi = {(b π,x) ∈ ×i∈NP[∆(i)] × ∆n−1
κ : x ∈ Mi(b π,s)},
such that (b πk,xk) → (b π,x) / ∈ GrMi. By Lemma 4, x ∈ c Wi(b π,s), i.e., x is feasible. Thus, since
(b π,x) / ∈ GrMi, there exists y ∈ argmax{Ui(z) | z ∈ c Wi(b π,s)} such that Ui(y) > Ui(x). Note that
by Lemma 4 we must have yi > 0. Otherwise, Lemma 4 guarantees the existence of z ∈ c Wi (b π,s)
such that zi > 0, hence Ui(z) > δpi ≥ Ui(y) if yi = 0, a contradiction. Thus, yi > 0. Then by the
continuity of b Uh,Uh, all h ∈ N, and by Lemma 3, there is appropriate y0 ∈ c Wi(b πk,s) such that
b Ui(y0) > b Ui(xk), for large enough k. But this contradicts (b πk,xk) ∈ GrMi. Thus, we have arrived
at a contradiction that emanates from the working hypothesis that GrMi is not closed. Hence, Mi
is upper-hemicontinuous and the proof of the Lemma is complete.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a selector b π∗ : ∆κ−1
0 → ×i∈NP[∆(i)] from B∗. The
restriction of b π∗ to b π∗
i : ∆κ−1
0 → P[∆(i)], determines randomizations over proposals for player i
and status quo s ∈ ∆κ−1
0 . Thus, by combining the above selector with the proposal strategies from
Proposition 1, we obtain proposal strategies π∗
i : ∆ → P[∆] for each i ∈ N. From these proposal
strategies we calculate expected payoﬀs U∗
i (x), x ∈ ∆, in accordance with equations (4) and (5)
for each i ∈ N. In particular U∗
i (x) coincides with Ui(x) deﬁned in (11) for all x ∈ ∆n−1
κ , so
that we can trivially compute v∗
i (x) and U∗
i (x) for x ∈ ∆κ−1
0 . Using these expected payoﬀs U∗
i we
obtain voting strategies A∗
i, i ∈ N, that satisfy condition (2). To show that these strategies form
11Failure of lower-hemicontinuity occurs at certain suboptimal but feasible proposals that allocate zero to the
proposer. Because of the last part of Lemma 4, this does not inﬂuence the continuity properties of Mi.
33an equilibrium it suﬃces to show the following:
For all x ∈ ∆κ−1
0 , and all coalitions C ⊂ N with |C| = κ + 1,
there exists y ∈ ∆n−1
κ such that U∗
j (y) ≥ U∗
j (x) for all j ∈ C.
(*)
Indeed, by construction, proposal strategies π∗
i : ∆ → P[∆] are such that any proposer i ∈ N,
optimizes over acceptable proposals in ∆n−1
κ . In addition (*) ensures that for any proposal x ∈ ∆κ−1
0
available to proposer i, there exists an acceptable proposal y ∈ ∆n−1
κ that is at least as good. Thus,
π∗
i : ∆ → P[∆] satisfy equilibrium condition (3), and we have an equilibrium as desired.
Thus, to prove the Proposition we need show (*) is true. Consider any x ∈ ∆κ−1
0 and deﬁne
d∗
j(x) = (1 − δ)−1 max{U∗
j (x) − δpj,0}, j ∈ N. Without loss of generality, assume players are
ranked so that j > i ⇒ dj(x) ≥ di(x). Now choose any majority coalition C ⊂ N with |C| = κ+1,






h(x) ≤ 1. Then
(*) follows since for y ∈ ∆κ with
yj =

   
   
d∗




i(x) if j = h,
0 otherwise,
we have yh = 1 −
P
i∈C\{h} d∗
i(x) ≥ (1 − δ
P
i/ ∈C pi)d∗
h(x) and it is immediate from (11), (8), and
the deﬁnition of d∗
j that U∗
j (y) ≥ U∗
j (x) for all j ∈ C.






h(x) ≤ 1. Let l ∈ N be such that
l = min{i ∈ N : di(x) > 0}. We start by constructing a lower bound on U∗




i (x) ≥ (1 − δ)xi + δ(pi(1 − δ)(1 − D) + δpi), i = 1,...,l − 1, (24)
where D =
Pκ+1
i=1 di(x) < 1 by Claim 2 of Lemma 4. To see why (24) holds, ﬁrst note that all
players other than i propose alternatives in ∆n−1
κ+1. This is because Lemma 3 ensures that a proposer
other than i who contemplates a proposal such that κ+1 players receive a positive allocation, can
proﬁtably reduce the allocation of one player (possibly i) to zero still obtaining majority support.
By implication, i receives zero in all proposals by other players, so that i obtains utility δpi with
probability (1−pi). Also, i can secure utility of at least (1−δ)(1−D)+δpi when proposing with




i (x) − δpi) = 1 − δ, thus, if l = 1 we must have
P
i∈C d∗







h(x) < 1 (and (*)) it remains to consider l > 1. By summing both




i (x) − δpi) ≥ (1 − δ)
l−1 X
i=1


















i/ ∈C pi, while if h < l, d∗
h(x) = 0. In either case we












Since 0 < δ < 1, and
Pl−1





































Since we have that
Pl−1
i=1 d∗


















But the left-hand side is equal to 1, by the fact that d∗
i(x) = (1 − δ)−1(U∗
i (x) − δpi) for
i = l,...,n, and since (1 − δ)−1 Pn
i=1(U∗







and the proof of (*) and of the Proposition is complete.
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